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This  article investigates the levels of owner influence in 
211  different  print  and  broadcast  outlets  in  32  different 
European  media  markets.  Drawing  on  the  literature  from 
industrial  organisation,  it  sets  out  reasons  why  we  should 
expect  greater  levels  of  influence  where  ownership  of 
individual outlets is concentrated; where it is concentrated in 
the  hands  of  individuals  or  families;  and  where  ownership 
groups  own  multiple  outlets  in  the  same  media  market. 
Conversely, we should expect lower levels of influence where 
ownership is dispersed between transnational companies. The 
articles uses original data on the ownership structures of these 
outlets, and combines it with reliable expert judgments as to 
the  level  of  owner  influence  in  each  of  the  outlets.  These 
hypotheses are tested and confirmed in a multilevel regression 
model of owner influence. The findings are relevant for policy 
on  ownership  limits  in  the  media,  and  for  the  debate  over 
transnational versus local control of media.  (6,954 words)
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1  Introduction
In 1981, the Thompson Organisation had to decide to whom to sell its flagship 
titles, the Times and Sunday Times. The group had two concerns – that the future 
of  both papers be guaranteed,  and that  their  independence from proprietorial 
influence  be  preserved.  Editorial  independence  had  been  an  issue  when  the 
Thompson Organisation initially acquired the newspapers, and remained salient, 
especially  given  the  Sunday  Times’  free-wheeling  investigative  journalism 
(Shawcross, 1997, 122). One question for those directing the sale was whether 
‘youthful’  and  ‘vigorous’  Australian  Rupert  Murdoch  could  guarantee  that 
independence. This group had to bear in mind that Murdoch’s company, News 
Corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary News International, was ultimately 
controlled by the Murdoch family, who had a stake of around 46% through their 
investment vehicle Cruden Investments (Stevenson, 1985). Accordingly, when 
the group decided to accept Murdoch’s bid, it imposed several conditions, not 
least that the board of the newspaper have a majority of independent directors 
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who would have to approve the appointment of editors (Leveson, 2011, 104–
105). 
Concerns over editorial independence of a different sort were expressed by 
journalists in Central and Eastern Europe during the first wave of take-overs of 
print  and  broadcast  titles  by  transnational  media  companies.  Reactions 
“displayed a mixture of hopes and concerns” (Stetka, 2012, 438). The European 
Federation  of  Journalists  warned that  the  aggressive  commercialism of  these 
corporations  risked  undermining  journalistic  standards,  presumably  including 
editorial  independence  (Stetka,  2012,  439).  This  concern  was  not  due  to  the 
presence  of  a  strong individual  ownership interest  –  a  Rupert  Murdoch or  a 
Silvio Berlusconi. Rather, it was due to a fear that dispersed corporate ownership 
could still pose a threat to editorial independence. 
Whilst  the  Thompson  Organisation  and  Central  and  Eastern  European 
journalists  faced  very  different  choices,  they  shared  a  common  interest  in 
protecting editorial independence. Their choices were no doubt influenced by the 
character of the respective parties, perhaps even their ‘alarming charm’ (Evans, 
1983,  124).  For  academics  and  policy-makers,  however,  important  questions 
exist  independently  of  the  charm  or  suasion  exercised  by  individuals. 
Considering  the  following structural  characteristics,  which  group had greater 
reason to be concerned about owner influence – the Thompson group, faced with 
a  company  (News Corporation)  already  operating  in  the  UK market,  with  a 
single dominant individual ownership interest (Rupert Murdoch)?  Or journalists 
in  Central  and Eastern Europe,  faced with  foreign-owned companies  making 
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their first foray in emerging markets, with multiple foreign owners of different 
types? 
Strangely,  the  academic  literature  offers  no easy answer  to  this  question, 
despite  agreement  that  the  important  question  was  whether  or  not  owner 
influence was “due to the characteristics of individual owners and managers or 
to  some  systematic  impact  inherent  in  the  different  types  of  ownership  and 
management” (Lacy, 1991, 38). Lack of an easy answer is not due to inattention 
to questions of ownership: in many instances we know who owns the media (for 
a  given  understanding  of  ownership),  either  within  a  single  country  (Noam, 
2009)  or  across  many  countries  (Djankov  et al.,  2003).  Nor  is  it  due  to 
inattention to  influences  on journalism,  as  this  is  currently  an active area  of 
research (Hanitzsch and Mellado,  2011).  Rather,  it  is  due to  the difficulty  of 
collecting  sufficient,  and  sufficiently  varied,  data  on  both  influence  and 
ownership structure. This is particularly difficult when interest lies not just in 
identifying  a  single  ‘type’  of  owner  (‘transnational  corporation’  or  ‘media 
tycoon’), but in identifying the shares of different ownership interests, and the 
concentration thereof. Such research requires much tedious work in analyzing 
annual  company  reports.  Nevertheless,  investigation  in  this  level  of  detail  is 
necessary, because it is the kind of detail with which regulators must regularly 
operate, as recent cases in the UK have shown (Ofcom, 2010).
This article therefore presents detailed data on the ownership structure of 211 
media titles  in 32 different media markets.1 This data allows us to investigate the 
1 Austria, Flemish Belgium, Francophone Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, 
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effects on owner influence of concentration of ownership, the type of ownership 
interests, and whether or not the ownership group as a whole owns multiple titles 
within  the  domestic  market.  After  reviewing  relevant  literature,  I  go  on  to 
discuss the sources of my data on ownership structure, and expert judgments of 
owner influence. I model levels of owner influence using a multilevel regression 
model, before concluding and discussing the implications of these findings for 
regulators. 
2  Literature
The ‘problem’ of owner influence is not unique to media companies. Tensions 
between shareholders  and  corporate  executives  are  almost  as  well  known as 
tensions between media owners and their editors. Because this problem is shared 
with  other  companies,  I  analyze  owner  influence  over  media  outlets  by 
borrowing from the literature on industrial organisation. Before I can summarize 
that literature, I first describe some conceptual issues relating to ownership and 
influence.  Having clarified  these  concepts,  I  then  move on to  discussing the 
findings  of  the  existing  media  studies  literature  on ownership  and influence, 
before introducing the literature on industrial organisation. 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine. 
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What is ownership? 
The considerable  literature on media ownership2 has  often  faced one serious 
problem  in  understanding  ownership,  namely  a  problem  of  aggregating 
ownership across  multiple  media  outlets  operating  in  different  media.  Cross-
ownership of print and broadcast outlets makes it  difficult to find a common 
denominator  in  terms of audience share or  circulation.  Public  media make it 
difficult to find a common denominator in terms of revenue. This problem of 
aggregation  masks  a  more  fundamental  problem  of  identifying  particular 
ownership interests. One option is to suggest that each media outlet has a single 
ultimate ownership interest. This is the approach taken by Djankov et al. (2003), 
who proceed according to the following algorithm:
1. identify, for each media outlet, all the ownership interests (proximate 
owners); 
2. of the proximate owners identified in the preceding step, take the proximate 
owner with the largest share of ownership; 
3. if this ownership share is greater than 20%, ask whether this proximate owner 
is an individual, a family, an association of employees, or the state 
4. if yes, identify this owner as the ultimate owner, and stop 
5. if no, return to step (2) and repeat, identifying the proximate owners of this 
proximate owner. 
2 Here I am largely addressing the literature on media ownership 'as data' in contrast to 
broader normative and ideological accounts of ownership, though such accounts obviously 
supervene (to a greater or lesser degree) on such empirical accounts (Freedman, 2012).
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6. if the ownership share from (2) is not greater than 20%, identify the 
ownership as widely held. 
Using this method, Djankov et al. (2003, 373) are able to claim that media firms 
“nearly  universally  have  ownership  structures  with  large  controlling 
shareholders and that  these shareholders are  either  families or governments”. 
This approach, and in particular its insistence that media are ultimately owned 
by an owner of a given ‘type’, is helpful and not overly reductive when the aim 
is construct aggregate national statistics about state, family, or private company 
ownership. However, it is less appropriate when the aim is to investigate control 
of particular outlets. In some cases, insistence of chasing down a single ultimate 
owner means going through three or four levels of proximate owners. Eventual 
ultimate owners can be left with a very small share of the media outlet as a result 
of  share  splits  at  each  level  of  ownership.  This  is  the  case  for  the  Bonnier 
family’s  22.9%  ownership  of  Radio  Nova,  Finland,  and  for  the  Schneider 
family’s 23.3% ownership of TV Danmark.3 In these cases, it is difficult to say 
that  this  ultimate  owner  ‘owns’ the  relevant  media  outlet.  It  also  leaves  the 
question of the concentration of ownership unanalysed.
What is owner influence? 
The  influence  exerted  by  owners  on  media  workers  (journalists,  editors  and 
managers) is one of many sources of influence. Of the six domains proposed by 
Hanitzsch and Mellado (2011, 406-407), owner influence falls within the domain 
of organizational influences, “sources of influence that emanate from multiple 
3  Figures from the Djankov et al. dataset. 
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levels:  from within  the  newsroom (supervisors  and higher  editors)  and from 
within  the  media  organization  (management  and ownership)”.  This  might  be 
considered as owner influence  per se. A separate domain of influence is often 
associated  with  owner  influence,  and  in  particular  ownership  by  companies, 
namely  the  domain  of  economic  influences  (“profit  expectations  of  media 
companies, advertising considerations, the needs of advertisers”: Hanitzsch and 
Mellado  (2011,  407)).  To  some  extent  these  interests  are  also  shared  by 
journalists,  editors  and  managers  (Zaller  1999  includes  audience  share  as  a 
component  of  journalists’  utility  function).  The  concern  here  is  not  with 
economic influences, but rather with owner influence in its classic antagonistic 
relationship to editorial  independence.  In particular,  I  am interested in  owner 
influence of the kind suggested by the examples at the beginning of this article: 
influence designed to shift the political and social tenor of the title’s coverage. 
This  kind  of  influence  is  easiest  to  identify  when exercised  overtly,  through 
company  memos,  irate  phone  calls,  or  interference  in  hiring  and  dismissal 
(Bagdikian,  2004,  15–16);  but  this  visible  face  of  power  is  rarely  the  most 
consequential (Lukes, 1974), and influential owners rarely have to make their 
wishes known in order to have their will done. This raises the difficult issue of 
identifying owner influence empirically. Although a large body of work attempts 
to  identify  the  consequences  of  owner  influence  for  differences  in  output 
(Gaziano, 1989; DellaVigna and Kennedy, 2011), in this article I evaluate owner 
influence  through  an  expert  survey.  Not  only  is  inference  through  content 
analysis tricky, it is also conceptually flawed, for influence may not translate to 
8
differences in output where equal and opposing influences exist. Consequently, 
reliance on perceptual data is a necessary step. 
What does the literature say? 
There is a considerable literature on media ownership. However, much of this 
literature has  examined concentration of ownership at  the level  of the media 
market,  rather  than  concentration  of  ownership  within  a  given  media  outlet. 
Even articles which do examine the ownership of specific outlets tend to ignore 
aspects of within-outlet ownership concentration (Djankov et al., 2003). There is 
scholarship on  particular types of ownership. A rich vein of literature examines 
the consequences (particularly consequences for news and current affairs output) 
of ownership by media tycoons or moguls (Tunstall and Palmer, 1991; Stetka, 
2012), by political parties (Hadenius 1983, Hamilton 2004, 37-70), by the state 
(Besley and Prat, 2006; Curran et al., 2009), and by multinational corporations 
(Stetka, 2012). However, much of this literature is interested in the effects of 
aggregate  patterns  of  ownership  on  aggregate  outcomes,  and  at  least  some 
interesting characteristics of ownership (such as the concentration of ownership 
within an individual  outlet)  cannot  be aggregated to  a  system level.  What  is 
needed,  therefore,  is  broader  theoretical  canvas  which  can  bring  together 
discussions of ownership concentration and discussions of different ownership 
types.  I suggest that the literature on the industrial  organisation of the media 
offers that broader canvas. 
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What does the industrial organisation literature say? 
The  literature  on  industrial  organisation  offers  two separate  insights  into  the 
extent of owner influence over media outlets. The first insight comes from work 
following Berle and Means (1932), and which identifies levels of concentration 
of ownership as a key factor in determining owners’ influence. A second insight 
comes from the literature on the benefits of ownership, and in particular the non-
pecuniary benefits. 
Berle and Means (1932) noted the increasing dispersion of stock ownership 
in modern corporations, and argued that this, together with the spread of non-
voting shares, had led to a lack of shareholder control over executives. Lack of 
control was undesirable because executives pursued policies which maximized 
their own income at the expense of shareholders’ return on investment. Share-
holding in media companies is much more concentrated than shareholding in 
other companies (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). It would therefore seem that owners 
of media companies can exercise much more control than other owners. Insofar 
as that control is exercised to prevent media managers from shirking or self-
dealing, this is beneficial; but insofar as that control is exercised in order to instil 
a particular editorial line in a media outlet, the ‘problem’ of media ownership is 
precisely the opposite of the problem identified by Berle and Means – there is 
too much, rather than too little control. 
Bearle-Means style arguments have been repeatedly advanced in the field of 
the media by David Demers.  Demers (1999) argues that corporate control of 
newspaper production in the United States, far from dampening editorial vigour, 
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actually results in an increase in independent-minded journalism, as newspaper 
managers (i.e., editors) shirk the control of their dispersed corporate principals. 
Since Demers only includes ‘ownership structure’ as one of five dimensions of 
‘corporate newspaper structure’, it is not possible to test directly the effects of 
concentration  of  ownership  (Demers  and  Merskin,  2000,  115–116)). 
Nevertheless, we can consider concentration of ownership to act as an important 
factor intervening between (normally) independently-minded editors and owners 
who may have other interests. 
In Demers’ work, and indeed in most work in industrial  organisation, the 
“standard  assumption  …  is  that  owners  want  the  company  to  maximize… 
shareholder  value.  Although  this  assumption  may  be  sufficient  for  many 
purposes, it is strictly speaking only an approximation of the more general idea 
that owners (like managers) may be expected to maximize their utility, which 
may depend on other factors” (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000, 692). Certainly, for 
many standard financial  indicators companies  predominantly owned by some 
types  of  ownership  interests  (natural  persons  or  families)  enjoy  different 
outcomes  to  companies  predominantly  owned  by  other  types  (institutional 
investors, banks) (ibid). In the media, part of an explanation for this difference 
derives  from the  amenity  potential  of  ownership.  Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985, 
1161) define amenity potential as a ‘nonpecuniary income associated with the 
provision of leadership and with the ability to deploy resources to suit  one’s 
personal  preferences’,  and  argue  that  it  is  particularly  present  in  the  media. 
Obvious instances of amenity potential  include the potential  to rub shoulders 
11
with government ministers and enjoy the exercise of power or the perception of 
such power (which is often exaggerated by politicians themselves: Strömbäck 
and  Nord 2006,  157).  Although Demsetz  and Lehn  consider  explanations  of 
concentration  of  ownership  in  terms  of  amenity  potential  to  be  somewhat 
‘speculative’, if amenity potential is present in the media then it would seem to 
apply only to individual and/or family owners. It is unclear how a corporation 
could enjoy a nonpecuniary income resulting from the deployment of resources 
to  suit  personal  preferences.  Consequently,  the  known  amenity  potential  of 
media  ownership,  and  the  greater  relevance  of  such  amenity  potential  for 
individual and family owners, can give us a further insight, additional to those 
provided by the literature on the concentration of ownership, into media firm 
control. 
3  Theory
These insights can help us make predictions about levels of owner influence over 
media outlets. Specifically, we may model actual levels of owner influence as if 
they were the result of a voting game, where owners with divergent preferences 
over  the  ideal  level  of  owner  influence  vote  on  proposals  made  by  the 
management of the media outlet. The key intuition is that, just as in the Bearle-
Means  account,  dispersed  shareholders  find  it  difficult  to  vote  down 
management  proposals  for  high  levels  of  executive  remuneration,  dispersed 
shareholders  also  find  it  difficult  to  agree  on  a  significant  departure  from 
management-proposed low levels of owner influence. High levels of influence 
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are possible, where owners have preferences over influence that are skewed to 
the high-influence end of the spectrum, or where ownership is concentrated, but 
absent these two features the management will get its way. 
Formally,  the  voting  game begins  when management  proposes  a  level  of 
owner  influence  somewhere  on  the  line  [0,1],  where  higher  values  indicate 
greater owner influence. This proposal might, for example, allocate the power to 
nominate various directors of divisions of the outlet, or propose a division of 
board members, or an editorial charter, or some other device. Owner interests 
then  have  to  vote  on  this  proposal,  according to  some decision-making rule 
(majority or qualified majority). Owner interests may vote the proposal down 
and make counter-proposals. However, if no counter-proposal is accepted (over 
some fixed number of rounds of counter-proposals), the policy reverts back to 
the policy proposed by the management. Assume that, on average, management 
proposals  are  to  the  left  of  the  ideal  points  of  individual,  family,  and 
state/political party ownership interests: i.e., they prefer lower levels of owner 
influence. If there are no problems of coordination between ownership interests 
(perhaps because there is  a sole  ownership interest),  then the level  of owner 
influence will be higher than the management proposal. Generally, we may say 
that the more dispersed ownership is, the greater the problem of coordinating on 
a counter-proposal, and thus the smaller the departure from the status quo, and 
the lower average level of owner influence. 
Holding ownership concentration constant, the level of departure from the 
low-influence status quo will depend on the preferences of the different voting 
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interests.  Here, I  hypothesise that,  because of the amenity potential  of media 
ownership,  individual  and family preferences  will  generally  be further  to  the 
right  than  company preferences.  If  ownership interests  uniformly prefer  high 
levels of owner influence (perhaps if they are all individuals), then the eventual 
outcome will be far to the right of the initial management proposal. Conversely, 
if  preferences  are  distributed  around  the  management’s  ideal  level  of  owner 
influence, then owner interests to the left of management will have an interest in 
voting down any proposal resulting in greater owner influence. 
Differences  in  mean  levels  of  owner  influence  between countries  can  be 
accounted for, if only minimally, by assuming that certain characteristics of the 
media system shift both management and ownership interests left or right by the 
same constant. Thus, the status quo ex ante might involve much greater owner 
influence in Italy than in Sweden. 
We can extract one further hypothesis from the theory if we draw certain 
inferences from share-holdings in multiple outlets. One feature of the ‘amenity 
potential’ of  media  outlet  ownership  is  that  it  cannot  easily  be  transferred 
between countries. Silvio Berlusconi enjoyed huge political influence in Italy; 
but his efforts to replicate that success in France and (to a lesser extent) Spain 
largely failed. Consequently, owners who hold ownership interests in multiple 
countries are, on balance, likely to be more interested in maximizing return on 
investment  than  they  are  in  the  amenity  potential  of  media  ownership. 
Conversely, owners who hold multiple ownership interests in the same country 
are, on balance, more likely to be interested in the amenity potential of media 
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ownership than they are in maximizing return by investing over a range of media 
markets. There is no necessary contradiction between maximizing one’s return 
on investment and exercising influence (see Mullainathan and Shleifer, 2005). 
However,  at  least  when  considering  sequential  and  separate  investments,  it 
would seem unusual if profit-maximizing owners were to seek out investment 
opportunities and conclude that more than one of the best opportunities lay in the 
same media market. 
This  theory  could  enable  us  to  make  point  predictions  if  we  knew  the 
preferences of ownership interests directly. Unfortunately, we do not know this, 
and therefore must make predictions which are based on the effect of single 
factors  increasing,  holding  other  factors  constant.  The  first  of  the  factors 
identified had to do with the concentration of voting power. The concentration 
hypothesis claims that
H 1 The greater the concentration of voting power within an outlet, the greater 
the degree of owner influence 
for the reasons related above which had to do both with co-ordination problems 
which  exist  with  very  dispersed  voting  power,  and  from  reasons  related  to 
smaller  departures  from the  status  quo  given  a  larger  number  of  ownership 
interests. The identity hypothesis claims that 
H 2 The greater the share of voting power within an outlet held by individuals 
and families compared to companies and, the greater the degree of owner 
influence 
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This  relates  to  earlier  assumptions  about  the  amenity  potential  of  ownership 
being accessible only to individuals and families rather than corporate agents. To 
the extent that  these assumptions are false,  and corporate interests  appreciate 
acting as power-brokers (as Fiat did with its ownership of La Stampa), then this 
hypothesis will not be born out. 
The repeat-player hypotheses claim that
H 3 The greater the share of voting power held by ownership interests which 
have other ownership interests in the same country, the greater the degree of 
owner influence 
H 4 The greater the share of voting power held by ownership interests which 
have ownership interests in other different media markets, the lower the degree 
of owner influence 
This  relates  to  earlier  assumptions  about  the  amenity  potential  of  ownership 
being more difficult to enjoy in two countries simultaneously than the return on 
investment on two investments in different countries. 
Data and modelling choices
This  article  draws  on  two  sources  of  data:  data  concerning  the  ownership 
structure of  different  outlets,  and expert  judgments  concerning the  degree  of 
ownership influence over each outlet. 
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Ownership structure
Data on the ownership of the outlets in the 32 media markets in the study as of 
the start of 2010 was collected by searching company news sources on Lexis-
Nexis, and in particular by searching financial news services such as the Major 
Companies  Database,  ISS  Proxy  Research  reports,  and  Worldscope.  Where 
information could not be located on Lexis-Nexis, information was located either 
through  group  websites  and  annual  reports,  or  through  media  regulators’ 
websites. Where this was not possible, newspaper articles were resorted to. For 
each outlet information on up to ten owners was collected. For each owner, the 
name, percentage share of ownership, and type were recorded. We coded owner 
types as follows:
I Individual 
Fam Family, including family foundations 
Found Foundation 
C Private Company 
N/P/S Political party, state actor, or non-profit (often trades unions) 
Many outlets included in the data have very complicated ownership structures. 
As far as possible, attempts were made to identify ultimate owners rather than 
proximate owners. Therefore, where a media outlet was wholly or partly owned 
by another  company,  and where  that  company was  wholly  owned by a  third 
company or entity, the name, type, and percentage ownership of that third entity 
were reported. To give an example: the Irish broadcaster TV3 is 100% owned by 
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a company called Tullamore Beta, which is 100% owned by a company called 
Tullamore Alpha, which is 100% owned by a company called Tullamore Omega, 
which is owned by the private equity fund Doughty Hanson (90.75%) and Peter 
Ennis (9.25%). Doughty Hanson and Peter Ennis were therefore reported as the 
two  ultimate  owners  of  TV3,  and  as  a  private  company  and  an  individual 
respectively. 
As far as possible,  we attempted to identify either  at  least  six ownership 
interests, or at least a cumulative total of 80% of ownership in the company. On 
average, 88.53% of ownership was identified in the 211 outlets. For 59 outlets it 
was not possible to find information on 80% of ownership: in most of these 
cases,  ownership  is  known  to  be  widely  dispersed  through  publicly  traded 
shares. Because we are interested in corporate control rather than just corporate 
ownership, I calculated the Banzhaf scores for each ownership interest (Banzhaf, 
1964). The Banzhaf score for a given ownership interest is the percentage of 
winning coalitions  of  ownership interests  (under  some decision making rule) 
which would cease to be winning if actor  i voted differently. Here, we assume 
that the decision-making rule is a majority rule, and that 50% + 1 of votes are 
necessary to pass motions. Where we were unable to locate information on 100% 
of the ownership of a media outlet, we assume that remaining ownership stakes 
are  infinitesimally small  and can be ignored;  the Banzhaf  index can then be 
calculated as if the identified ownership shares representing 100% of the voting 
stock. 
[Figure 1 about here]
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Figure 1 shows the distribution of share-holding percentages and Banzhaf scores 
for the first,  second, third,  and remaining ranked ownership interests.  Plotted 
circles give the mean for all values; crosses give the mean for non-zero values 
only.  Both  panels  of  the  figure  show  visually  the  very  quick  drop-off  in 
shareholding and control between the largest and all remaining owners. 
We  can  speak  more  precisely  about  concentration  of  ownership  by 
summarizing the Banzhaf scores of the different owners. Specifically, we can 
talk  about  the  effective  number  of  relevant  owners,  which  is  equal  to  the 
reciprocal of the sum of squared Banzhaf scores. The mean effective number of 
relevant owners is 1.62; this figure is lower for television (1.39) than it is for 
newspapers (1.79), and this difference is statistically significant (Welch’s t= 2.61 
on 203.42 degrees of freedom, p= 0.01). Differences in ownership concentration 
between media markets are not statistically significant (F(31,179) = 1.05, p ≈ 
0.4). In some media markets, outlets have on average only one effective owner 
(Belgium Francophone, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta), whilst in others the figure is 
much higher. 
We can also compare differences in the types of owners by summing the 
different Banzhaf scores for each company according to the type of owner. For 
our  purposes  the  most  interesting  variation  is  variation  in  the  cumulative 
Banzhaf score of all individual owners of each media outlet, where the average 
across all outlets is 0.26, which differs according to media markets (F(31, 179) = 
2.46, p ≈ 0). Individual shares of voting power are on average lowest in Flemish 
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Belgium (0), Francophone Belgium (0) and Denmark (0), and highest in Latvia 
(0.6), Italy (0.72) and Ukraine (0.78). 
Finally,  we  may  examine  which  ownership  groups  are  'repeat  players'  at 
national, international, or both levels. Here we must shift the level of analysis 
from the individual ownership interest  to the ownership group. We identify a 
repeat-player at international level as any group the members of which are all 
also present in another outlet in a different country; a repeat player at national 
level any group the members of which are all also present in another outlet in the 
same country;  and ‘single-shotters’ and dual  repeat-players  as  simple  logical 
combinations of both of these. Most (113) of the outlets are single-shotters; only 
16 are dual repeat-players. 
Owner influence
The data on owner influence come from a 2010 survey of experts in the media 
systems  of  32  European  media  markets  conducted  by  Popescu  et al.  (2012). 
Experts  were  asked  to  indicate  their  agreement  with  a  series  of  statements 
concerning the top media outlets, typically but not always the public broadcaster, 
the top three newspapers, and the top three commercial television stations. (In 
this article I ignore owner influence on the public broadcaster, since this involves 
a  different  set  of  considerations:  Hanretty  2010).  One  of  these  statements 
concerned what we term owner influence. Experts were asked “how much is the 
political  coverage  in  the  [relevant]  media  outlet  influenced  by its  owners?”. 
Responses  were  on  a  scale  from zero  (low levels  of  influence)  to  ten  (high 
20
levels).  The  reliability  of  the  mean of  expert  judgements  is  high:  the 
Steenbergen-Marks reliability coefficient (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007) is 0.93. 
The average across all outlets is 6.11, but this once again masks significant 
differences between media markets (F(31, 179) = 15.12, p ≈ 0). Owner influence 
is  on average lowest in the Netherlands (2.01),  Denmark (2.46) and Norway 
(3.19), and highest in Greece (8.1), Cyprus (8.62) and Malta (9.2). These country 
differences  match  normal  assessments  of  press  freedom  in  each  of  these 
countries.
[Table 1 about here]
Other variables
I also gathered data on the degree of concentration in the market, understood as 
the concentration of audience shares (press: readership) amongst different media 
groups, as calculated using the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of concentration. I 
include this  in  the models  that  follow because of  the possibility  that  owners 
might be less likely to exercise influence where the market is competitive and 
potential  competitors  can easily  attract  readers  or  viewers  who, for whatever 
reason,  are  dissatisfied  by  the  type  of  coverage  which  results  when  owners 
intervene. 
I also recorded whether each outlet was a print or broadcast outlet. I include 
this in the models that follow because of the possibility that owners in broadcast 
media might be less able to exercise influence due to the common requirement in 
European media systems that broadcast media follow norms of impartiality or 
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fairness. Table 1 shows summary statistics for all of the numerical variables used 
in the models that follow. 
Modelling choices
To account  for  the fact  that  outlets  are  nested  within  countries,  I  estimate  a 
multilevel  model  using  a  linear  regression  model  with  a  random  country 
intercept.
For  technical  reasons,  separate  variables  cannot  be  included  for  all 
ownership  types,  and  so  one  type  must  be  chosen  as  a  reference  category. 
Consequently, I use company ownership as a reference category; the coefficients 
for  other  types  of  ownership  therefore  represent  the  change  from  company 
ownership. 
4  Results
Table  2  shows the  results  of  two models,  one  with  variables  relating  to  the 
concentration,  identity,  and repeat-player  hypotheses,  and one with additional 
controls  for  market  concentration  and  medium.  Random  intercepts  are  not 
shown, but are available on request. Three measures of fit are reported – the log-
likelihood,  the  Akaike  Information  Criterion,  and  the  Bayesian  Information 
Criterion.  Smaller  values  indicate  better  fit,  leading  us  to  prefer  the  more 
parsimonious model.
[Table 2 about here]
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These  results  confirm  our  hypotheses.  The  concentration  hypothesis is 
confirmed: an increase in the effective number of owners – that is, a decrease in 
ownership concentration – is associated with a reduction in owner influence at 
the 5% level of statistical significance. The substantive magnitude of changes in 
the effective number of owners is slight across both models. A one-unit change 
in  the effective number results  in  a  decrease of  between 0.167 and 0.194 in 
owner influence – roughly comparable to the difference between the average 
degree of ownership influence in Estonia (5.03) and the Czech Republic (5.22). 
Second,  the  identity  hypothesis is  also  confirmed.  There  is  likely  to  be 
significantly more owner influence in outlets that are owned by individuals and 
families  than  in  outlets  owned  by  companies.  This  effect  is  stronger  for 
individuals than for families,  perhaps reflecting coordination problems within 
families that are analogous to the coordination problems within the firm. The 
substantive magnitude of this effect is moderate. Each coefficient represents the 
change from 100% voting power (which means at least 50% of ownership) being 
held by a single company or a group of companies, to 100% voting power held 
by a single individual or a group of individuals, though obviously some changes 
in  ownership  structure  involving  individuals  or  companies  acquiring  smaller 
voting shares. Finally, the repeat-player hypothesis is also confirmed. Ownership 
groups  which  are  national  repeat-players  are  significantly  more  likely,  and 
ownership groups which are international repeat-players significantly less likely, 
to exercise owner influence, compared to the reference category (a ownership 
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group  which  possesses  a  single  title  or  channel).  Since  these  are  dummy 
variables, the coefficients simply measure the effect of a change of type. 
These  findings  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  controls  for  the  degree  of 
market concentration,  and  a  dummy for  whether  or  not  the  media  outlet  in 
question is a print or broadcast outlet. Contrary to expectations, owner influence 
is significantly higher in broadcast outlets.
5  Conclusion
In this article, I have demonstrated that higher levels of ownership concentration 
are associated with higher levels of owner influence over media outlets, and that 
owner  is  influence  is  greater  where  voting  power  within  the  company  is 
concentrated in the hands of individuals and families rather than companies. I 
have also shown that ownership groups which own multiple titles on the national 
level only are more likely to exercise owner influence, whereas groups which 
spread  their  ownership  across  titles  in  different  countries  are  less  likely  to 
exercise such influence. 
What are the consequences of these findings for the broader literature? I suggest 
that my findings precede much of the literature on the critical political economy 
of the media. That literature generally agrees on two premises: corporatization, 
the claim that ownership of media companies by (multinational) corporations is 
increasingly common (Williams, 1981, 51; Golding and Murdock 1996, 64), and 
commodification, the claim that media `products' are increasingly being treated 
as  having  no  value  other  than  exchange  value,  and  are  thus  no  different  to 
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products in other markets. It has either left unchallenged or ignored the standard 
assumption in micro-economics that corporations' behaviour can be described as 
if they were profit-maximizing, or, has argued that profit-maximizing behaviour 
is constrained on the margins by the need to maintain hegemony. 
My argument is that corporations may not be very good even at  maximizing 
profit, because corporatization in many instances is exaggerated (in my sample, 
nearly  two-fifths  of  all  ownership  interests  in  print  and  broadcast  media  in 
Europe are  individual  or  family  ownership  interests),  and because  individual 
owners have interests which cannot be reduced to profit (or shareholder return). I 
have therefore opened up an additional line of theoretically-informed criticism of 
private ownership of media companies. This criticism is important, because it 
shows that private ownership can fail on its own terms. Everything I have argued 
is entirely compatible with additional arguments that, since media `products' do 
have a value which is  distinct from their  exchange value (i.e.,  their  value in 
keeping  us  informed),  private  ownership  by  profit-maximizing  companies  is 
problematic.
Second,  insofar as I  open up lines  of critique which are separate  from those 
raised by the critical political economy of the media, I am pushing in the same 
direction as Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002), who argue that clientelism 
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"gets  us  beyond a  common dichotomy...  between  the  liberal  perspective,  for 
which democratization of the media is purely a matter of the elimination of state 
interference, and the critical political economy perspective, which has focused 
on the control  of  media  by private  capital,  but  has  until  now not  been very 
sophisticated in its analysis of variations in the relation of capital to the state, 
political parties and other institutions" (p. 184). Certainly the amenity potential 
of ownership is high in countries with a tradition of clientelism -- but as I have 
shown, that leads to only owner influence only through ownership concentration. 
The consequences of these findings for policy-makers are threefold. First, to the 
extent  that  policy-makers  and  regulators  are  involved  in  scrutiny  of  the 
acquisition of ownership shares in media outlets, they should exercise different 
levels  of  scrutiny  depending on whether  a  proposed acquisition  will  take  an 
ownership interest from an already-controlling share (i.e., greater than 50%+1, 
which  gives  a  Banzhaf  score of  1)  to  a  larger  share,  or  whether  instead the 
acquisition will increase the ownership interest’s voting power compared to the 
status  quo  ex  ante.  Second,  policy-makers  and  regulators  interested  in 
minimizing proprietorial  influence  have  good reason to  ‘pierce  the  corporate 
veil’ and  examine  the  ultimate  owners  behind  ownership  interests,  because 
ultimate owners  of  different  types  differ  in  the propensity  to  exercise  owner 
influence. 
Third,  insofar as minimizing owner influence is  concerned,  policy-makers 
should not erect higher barriers against ownership of media outlets by foreign 
operators (or more accurately, ownership groups which have other international 
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titles but no other domestic title). These groups reduce owner influence, and the 
transition  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  from  transnational  to  domestic 
ownership by well-connected individuals, identified by Stetka (2012), has only 
resulted in an increase in the extent to which any individual outlet’s editorial line 
can be traced back to the interests of its owner. 
The  qualification  in  this  last  recommendation  is  important.  Minimizing 
owner influence is rarely the only, or even the major, concern when regulating 
the media. Whilst owner influence of the kind we discuss here is one type of 
non-pecuniary benefit, or amenity potential, of media ownership, there are other 
non-pecuniary  benefits  which  are  more  socially  beneficial.  To  return  to  the 
example  with  which  this  article  started,  one  important  factor  in  Rupert 
Murdoch’s successful acquisition of the  Times and the  Sunday Times was his 
desire, forcefully stated and by all accounts sincere, to maintain both papers as 
important  and  prestigious  titles.  The  non-pecuniary  benefit  to  Murdoch  of 
maintaining  both  titles  has  led  to  considerable  losses  for  News International 
(News Corporation’s British subsidiary), which one estimate put at one million 
pounds weekly (Sabbagh, 2012). If access to a wide range of titles is valuable in 
democracies,  this  is  one  non-pecuniary  benefit  which  we  might  wish  to 
encourage by concentrated individual ownership. 
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Note: Circle () gives the mean for all values; + gives the mean for non-zero values
only.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Owner influence 211 6.111 2.127 1.200 10.000
Effective number of owners 211 1.622 1.213 1.000 7.669
Total individual voting power 211 0.263 0.415 0.000 1.000
Total family voting power 211 0.111 0.304 0.000 1.000
Total foundation voting power 211 0.050 0.214 0.000 1.000
Total Party / state / ass’n voting power 211 0.054 0.224 0.000 1.000
Market concentration 211 2,307.638 696.420 1,187.723 5,011.338
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Effective number owners  0:246  0:226
(0:071) (0:071)
Individual v. company 0:970 1:089
(0:237) (0:242)
Family v. company 0:557 0:657
(0:305) (0:307)
Foundation v. company  0:546  0:304
(0:419) (0:434)
Party / state / ass’n v. company 1:012 0:851
(0:440) (0:444)
National repeat-player 0:360 0:377
(0:212) (0:214)
International repeat-player only  0:514  0:730
(0:247) (0:266)







Log likelihood  362:398  368:638
Akaike Inf. Crit. 746:796 763:276
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 783:666 806:850
Note: p<0.1; p<0.05; p<0.01
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